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I. INTRODUCTION
In Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools,' the plaintiff was employed at the
defendant's company for twenty-five years before being discharged due to a
reduction in the work force. The plaintiff was told that the company would
consider rehiring him should its needs change Within two months of the
plaintiff's discharge, however, the defendant hired a younger person to do the
same job as the plaintiff.3 The plaintiff filed suit under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA),4 alleging that the reason for his discharge was
intentional discrimination based on his age.5
The district court, in a jury trial, found for the plaintiff on the basis that the
defendant had intentionally discriminated against him because of his age. The
defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
on the ground that the jury verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. A
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendant's sufficiency
argument and reversed the jury verdict. The court, however, later agreed to
review en banc its decision concerning sufficiency of the evidence.6 Held:
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW RIPVIEW.
1. 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
2. Id. at 991-92.
3. id. at 992.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994).
5. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 992.
6. Id. at 992. The case of Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools was heard before both the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on several
occasions. This note focuses on the decision of the Fifth Circuit when rehearing the case en banc,
75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996). However, throughout the note, there will be several references to the
original panel decision of the Fifth Circuit, 39 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 1994).
Rhodes was evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which is a jurisprudential method,
developed by the Supreme Court, to evaluate disparate treatment employment discrimination suits
involving circumstantial evidence. Therefore, this note will necessarily be limited to employment
discrimination cases brought under the disparate treatment theory. The McDonnell Douglas
framework has been applied to suits filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-20)0(h)-6 (1994) (McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.
Ct. 1817 (1973) (creating what became known as the McDonnell Douglas framework and applying
it to Title VII discrimination suits)), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-
634 (1994) (Bodenhelmer v. PPG Indust., Inc., 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework to ADEA cases)), the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1994) (Simms
v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework
to FHA cases)), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994) (Daigle
v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework
to ADA cases)).
It is important to distinguish between the disparate treatment theory of proving employment
discrimination and the disparate impact theory. The disparate treatment theory focuses on intentional
discrimination against employees by their employer based on some protected characteristic, while the
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[A] jury issue will be presented and a plaintiff can avoid summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law if the evidence taken as a
whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's
stated reasons [for the employment decision) was what actually
motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age
was a determinative factor in the actions of which the plaintiff
complains.!
According -to the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff in a disparate treatment employment
discrimination suit involving circumstantial evidence can survive a defendant's
motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence if the evidence presented
creates a question of fact as to the accuracy of the reasons offered by the
defendant for the employment decision and the jury can reasonably infer the
employment decision was motivated by discriminatory intent.
There are two major objectives of this note. The first is to explain what an
employee who files an employment discrimination suit in the Fifth Circuit must
prove in order to survive a defendant's motion challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence so that the issue of intentional discrimination becomes a question for
the trier of fact.' The second is to explain how adopting this standard of proof
affects employment discrimination law in the Fifth Circuit. Thus, it will be
necessary to: (1) examine how the Supreme Court has developed the law
concerning employment discrimination; (2) evaluate the role that evidence of an
employer's lack of truthfulness regarding its employment decision plays in
determining the existence of intentional discrimination and the approaches taken
by the courts to this evidence; (3) examine Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning these approaches and determine what guidance, if any, it provides;
and (4) evaluate how the. Fifth Circuit, in Rhodes, defined its approach for
determining what a plaintiff must prove to survive a defendant's motion
challenging sufficiency of the evidence.
H. PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE
A. Development of the McDonnell Douglas Framework
In 1973, the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,9
announced a general framework based on a "pretext theory" to be followed by
courts evaluating employment discrimination suits when the plaintiff had only
disparate impact theory focuses on a statistical analysis of employment decisions to prove
discriminatory practices. See infra text accompanying notes 9-22 for further discussion of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
7. Rhodis, 75 F.3d at 994.
8. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is made in the form of a motion for summary
judgment andlor a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
9. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
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circumstantial evidence with which to prove his claim. This framework was later
clarified in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,0 and St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks." These cases provide the backdrop against
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Rhodes
v. Gulberson Oil Tools.
The facts surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green are representative of many employment discrimination suits. The
plaintiff, a black man, was laid off due to a reduction in the defendant
company's work force. Less than a year later, the defendant began accepting
applications for the job previously performed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
applied for this job and was rejected.12  Plaintiff filed suit claiming he was
unlawfully discriminated against because of his race. 3
The Court in McDonnell Douglas established a three-tiered framework which
governs the shifting of the burden of production 4 in employment discrimination
suits based solely on circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. At
the first stage, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. A prima facie case is established by showing: (1) the plaintiff
is a member of a protected group; (2) the plaintiff applied for and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applications; (3) despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications. 5 By establishing a prima facie case, the employee creates
a presumption of intentional discrimination on the part of the employer.'
6
Assuming the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the inquiry proceeds
to the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework. At this stage the
10. 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
11. 509 U.S. 502. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
12. Plaintiff, after being laid off, participated In a "stall in" where he and several others parked
their cars in the mad leading to the defendant's plant thereby preventing the plant workers from
coming to and going from work. Plaintiff also participated In a "lock in" where he and several others
chained and padlocked the door to one of the plant buildings thereby preventing the plant workers
from entering and exiting the building. Defendant stated that his reason for not rehiring plaintiff was
his participation in the "stall in" and "lock in."
13. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 793-96, 93 S. Ct. at 1820-21.
14. "Burden of production" refers to the duty imposed on a party to provide sufficient evidence
concerning a particular aspect of the litigation. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, this
burden shifts between the plaintiff and the defendant depending on the particular stage in the
proceeding. See nfr text accompanying notes 48-53 for further discussion on burden of production.
15. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824.
16. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248. 254. 101 S. Ct. 1089. 1094
(1981). Applying these principles to the facts in McDonnell Douglas. the plaintiff established a
prima facie case. He was able to demonstrate that the defendant knew he was in a protected class
(i.e., he was black); that the defendant was seeking applications for'a job for which he was qualified;
that he applied and was rejected by the defendant; and that the defendant continued to seek
applications from persons with qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff. By establishing a prima
facie case, a presumption of Intentional discrimination was created in the plaintiff's favor.
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burden of production shifts to the defendant to set forth "reasons for its actions
which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful
discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."'" If the defendant
carries this burden of production (regardless of its persuasiveness), the
presumption of intentional discrimination, previously created in the plaintiff's
favor, is overcome and drops from the case."
Once the defendant satisfies its burden of production at the second stage of
the inquiry, the court must ascertain whether any questions of fact remain for the
trier of fact to consider. 9 No question of fact remains and the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if, based on the evidence presented, any
rational person would have to find the plaintiff established a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination, and the defendant failed to meet its burden of
production." If, however, the defendant fails to meet its burden of production
but reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff established a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, a
question of fact remains for the trier of fact.' If the plaintiff has established
a prima facie case and the defendant has met its burden of production, the
inquiry moves to the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
In the third stage or "pretext stage," the plaintiff is given the opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the "legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination."2
It is this stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework that has created confusion
in judicial interpretation and on which this paper focuses.
B. Subsequent Interpretation of the Third Stage of the McDonnell Douglas
Framework
The McDonnell Douglas framework was important because it provided the
courts with a vehicle through which they could fairly analyze employment
discrimination suits based solely on circumstantial evidence. While the
framework provided a workable solution to this problem, 3 federal appellate
17. St Mary's Honor Cu'. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S. Ct. 2742,2747 (1993) (emphasis
in original). See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S. Ct. at 1094-95 (establishing this principle).
18. Hicks, 509 U.S. at5ll, 113 S. CL at 2749. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S. Ct.
at 1094-95. Applying the principles from the second stage of the framework to the facts in
McDonnell Douglas, the defendant offered the plaintiff's participation in the "stall in" and the "lock
in" as its reason for not rehiring the plaintiff. The Court in McDonnell Douglas said this explanation
was sufficient to overcome the presumption established at the first stage.
19. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S. CL at 2748.
20. Id. at 509, 113 S. CL at 2748.
21. Id. at 509-10, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
22. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct. at 1093.
23. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d. 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (because




courts were divided over certain aspects of its application. One of the principal
areas of division concerned how courts should evaluate the "pretext stage" of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to determine whether the plaintiff has produced
enough evidence to survive a defendant's motion challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence.
An explanation by the defendant is considered a "pretext" if the trier of fact
finds it to be an inaccurate statement of the motivation for the action. As
applied to employment discrimination suits, pretext does not refer to a situation
in which an employer is wrong in its assessment of the facts; i.e., whether an
employee was a good worker. Rather, it concerns an employer who, whether
knowingly or unknowingly (e.g., employer offers the testimony of the decision-
maker believing it to be true), offers an incorrect explanation of his motive for
making a decision regarding an employee.' The courts and commentators have
developed three varying approaches based on "pretext" when that term is
considered in the context of the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work. These three approaches are commonly referred to as "pretext-only,"
"pretext-plus," and a middle-ground approach, which treats pretext as permitting
an inference of intentional discrimination.'
1. Pretext-Only
The pretext-only approach is based on the premise that as long as the
employee produces sufficient evidence from which it can be determined that the
employer's explanation for the adverse employment decision is untrue, the finder
24. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095.
25. Pretext-only and pretext-plus are terms of art first used by Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 43 Hastings LJ. 57 (1991), to articulate the manner in which a plaintiff may
meet his burden of production by circumstantial evidence under the "pretext theory" so as to survive
a defendant's motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The middle ground approach has
received much greater attention as a result of the Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks. 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (see infra text accompanying notes 54-61). While these
terms originally applied only to the plaintiffs burden of production to test sufficiency of the evidence
at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, courts have sometimes used them to refer
instead to the plaintiff's overall burden of persuasion. This has resulted in much confusion among
the courts.
In an attempt to alleviate some of this confusion, Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:
Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229 (1995). redefines these terms as they apply
to the plaintiff's burden of production In order to survive a defendant's motion challenging
sufficiency of the evidence. She begins with the assumption that a plaintiff must offer "combined
evidence" of Intentional discrimination, which is evidence sufficient to (1) establish a prima facie
case; and (2) show that the defendant's reasons were pretextual. She then defines three possible
methods of evaluating pretext evidence: (1) "judgment for the plaintiff always permitted," which is
analogous to the pretext-only approach; (2) "judgment for the plaintiff sometimes permitted," which
Is analogous to a later-developed permissive inference approach; and (3) "judgment for the defendant
required," which is analogous to the pretext-plus approach.
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of fact may make a reasonable inference that intentional discrimination was the
true reason.26 Thus, the only target for a sufficiency challenge is the plaintiff's
evidence of pretext, and not the trier of fact's decision regarding the ultimate
issue of intentional discrimination. Because of this permissible inference, the
employee is not required to make an affirmative showing of intentional
discrimination by direct evidence. Rather, indirect or circumstantial evidence
that the employer's decision was made to promote a discriminatory agenda is all
that is required.27 Therefore, the plaintiff would survive the defendant's motion
for summary judgment and/or judgment as a matter of law by producing
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case and sufficient evidence of
pretext.s
The rationale behind the pretext-only approach is that it is reasonable for the
trier of fact to infer that the employer's motive in offering an untrue explanation
for his actions is to conceal a discriminatory agenda.29 This position also has
jurisprudential support from the Court in Burdine when it stated that at the third
stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee's burden of proving
pretext "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the
employee] has been the victim of intentional discrimination." ° "This merged
burden, however, may be carried in one of two ways: the plaintiff may prove
discrimination 'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."' 3
2. Pretext-Plus
Courts that adopt the pretext-plus approach require the plaintiff to make a
dual showing at the pretext stage in order to defeat the defendant's motion
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Not only must a plaintiff in a
pretext-plus jurisdiction prove that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
26. Jody H. Odell, Comment, Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: Understanding St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and Its Application to Summary Judgment, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1251, 1258-59 (1994).
27. Lanctot, supra note 25, at 64.
28. Malamud's equivalent of the pretext-only standard is defined as "judgment for the plaintiff
is always permitted." This theory is predicated on the idea that "combined evidence" is always
sufficient for the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination; thus, the plaintiff can, as a matter of
law, defeat a motion for summary judgment. Malamud, supra note 25, at 2306.
29. Lanctot, supra note 25, at 114.
30. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S. Ct. 1089. 1095
(1981).
31. Odell, supra note 26. at 1259 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095).
Based on the facts in McDonnell Douglas. a plaintiff in a pretext-only jurisdiction, in order to
overcome a defendant's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment as a matter of law, must
produce sufficient evidence that the defendant's stated reason for not hiring him-i.e., because
plaintiff participated in the "stall in" and "lock in"-was untrue.
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offered by the defendant for the adverse employment decision was pretextual, but
he must also produce sufficient evidence that the real reason for the decision was
intentional discrimination."
The pretext-plus standard is based on the theory that it is improper to allow
the trier of fact to infer that discrimination was the true motivation for the
employment decision merely by producing sufficient evidence that the employ-
er's reason was untrue. 3 There may have been other lawful or unlawful, but
still not discriminatory, motivating forces, such as poor business judgment or
arbitrary behavior, which would justify the employer's decision.' An
employer's decision to offer a pretextual explanation for his action rather than
admit that he made a poor business decision is not enough by itself to support
a finding of intentional discrimination. Consequently, it is unfair to allow the
inference of intentional discrimination based solely on a showing that the
employer's proffered reason was pretextual. s
3. Permissive Inference
The permissive inference approach has received increased attention as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.'
Under this approach, the factfinder is permitted to infer intentional discrimination
when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and creates a fact issue as to
32. Odell, supra note 26, at 1258. Malamud's equivalent of the pretext-plus standard is termed
"judgment for the defendant required." Under this approach "combined evidence" without additional
proof of Intentional discrimination Is never sufficient for the plaintiff to defeat the defendant's motion
for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. Malamud, supra note 25, at 2306.
33. Lanctot, supra note 25. at 68.
34. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610. 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993) (The fact
that an employer acts unlawfully in making an employment decision does not necessarily mean he
violates a law designed to protect an employee from discrimination based on a specific characteristic
unless that specific characteristic was the basis for the discrimination).
35. Odell. supra note 26, at 1250-60. One commentator suggests that the pretext-plus standard
is adopted by courts because of their disbelief that employment discrimination is prevalent in the
workplace. Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic
Asswnption. 26 Conn. L. Rev. 997, 1023 (1994). Thus, courts following this approach distrust a
proxy or indirect method of proving discrimination. Another suggested reason is that the decision
to adopt pretext-plus is made out of fear that by allowing the employee's burden of production to be
less burdensome (i.e., adopting pretext.only), the quantity of employment discrimination litigation
would be greatly increased. Lanctot, supra note 25, at 69.
Based on the facts In McDonnell Douglas, to survive a defendant's motion challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence, the plaintiff, in a pretext-plus jurisdiction, would have to produce
suffcient evidence that the defendant's reason for not rehiring him was pretextual, and also that the
true reason he was not rehired was the defendant's intent to discriminate against him because he was
black.
36. 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). See Michael J. Lambert, St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks: The "Pretext-Maybe" Approach, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 163 (1994) (first to apply the term
"pretext-maybe" to the decision in Hicks); Odell, supra note 26. at 1269 (defining the middle ground
approach as "permissive Inference" in the context of Hicks).
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whether the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons were false. That inference,
however, must be supported by sufficient evidence so that the inference is
reasonable. Under this approach, the inference of discrimination is sometimes,
but not always, permitted on the basis of pretext evidence.37
C. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
1. Facts and Holding of Hicks
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
a majority of the courts of appeal had adopted the pretext-only approach as the
appropriate method for evaluating employment discrimination suits. This
majority included the Court of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits.38 The pretext-plus
approach was adopted by the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.39
Because of this split among the circuits over what approach was to be taken to
the pretext inquiry, many employment lawyers felt that the issue would be
37. Malamud, supra note 25, at 2306. Professor Malamud refers to the permissive inference
standard as, "judgment for the plaintiff sometimes permitted." The problem with the permissive
inference approach is that it does not provide an adequate standard from which a plaintiff or
defendant can predict results. Assume that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and that the
employer's explanation for its action was untrue. In a pretext-only jurisdiction, a plaintiff with this
evidence knows it should be sufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimination and thus
would get the case to the factfinder. Alternatively, a plaintiff with this evidence in pretext-plus
jurisdiction would know that this should not be sufficient to support a finding of intentional
discrimination. A plaintiff in a permissive inference jurisdiction with this evidence would have no
guarantee whether or not this evidence was sufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion.
Applying the facts in McDonnell Douglas to a plaintiff's burden of production in a "permissive
inference" jurisdiction, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence that the defendant's reason for
not rehiring him was pretextual. Based on this evidence and the prima facie case, the trier of fact
may be able to infer that intentional discrimination was the true reason.
38. Lanctot, supra note 25, at 71-75 nn.46-53 (citing the following cases as the leading case
for each respective circuit: Second, Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d I 108 (2d Cir. 1988);
Third, Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.3d 893 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S.
1052, 108 S. Ct. 26 (1987); Fifth, Thombrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1985); Sixth, Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924, 108
S. CL 285 (1987); Eighth, MacDissi v. Valmont Indus.. 856 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1988); Ninth, Lowe
v. City of Morovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985). mod0fed, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986); Tenth, Drake
v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir. 1991); District of Columbia, Bishopp v. District of
Columbia, 788 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
39. Lanctot, supra note 25, at 82-86 nn.92-96 (citing the following cases as the leading case
for each respective circuit: Fst, White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037 (Ist Cir. 1984); Fourth, Duke v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir. 1991); Seventh, North v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens-Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1988); Eleventh, Sparks v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, 830'F.2d 977 (11 th Cir. 1987)).
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resolved by the Supreme Court in Hicks.40 Whether this resolution actually
occurred is subject to differing opinions."
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks involved a Title VII discriminatory
discharge claim that was supported by only circumstantial evidence of intentional
discrimination. Melvin Hicks, a black man, was hired in 1978 as a correctional
officer at St. Mary's Honor Center, a state-run halfway house. Two years later
St. Mary's promoted him to shift commander. As a result of supervisory
changes in 1983, Hicks' immediate supervisor was removed and replaced by
John Powell. Before these changes, Hicks' employment record at St. Mary's had
been "satisfactory." Subsequent to these changes, however, Hicks was
disciplined repeatedly, suspended, and later demoted for failure to control his
subordinates. He was eventually discharged after threatening Powell during an
argumenL42
Hicks filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
district court, in a bench trial,"3 made the following findings of facts: (1) St.
Mary's reasons for discharging Hicks were pretextual; but (2) Hicks failed to
prove intentional discrimination was the true reason. Because of Hicks' failure
to prove intentional discrimination, the district court found in favor of St. Mary's
on the ground that Hicks had failed to meet his burden of persuasion. Hicks
appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, asserting
that a finding of pretext entitled him to judgment as a matter of law."
Agreeing with Hicks, the Eighth Circuit set aside the verdict of the district court
on the grounds that "once [Hicks] proved all of [St. Mary's] proffered reasons
for the adverse employment action to be pretextual, [Hicks] was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."'5 St. Mary's appealed this decision to the
Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision with the majority
opinion written by Justice Scalia, rejected the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit.
The Court held that in order for a plaintiff to prevail in an employment
discrimination suit, he must satisfy his ultimate burden of persuasion, which is
to prove intentional discrimination." Intentional discrimination cannot be
proven unless the defendant's explanation for the employment decision is shown
40. Daniel Grossman, The Pretext Burden After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 24 Colo.
Law 2349, 2349 (1995).
41. Developments In the Law: Employment Discrimination, Shifting Burdens of Proof in
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1579, 1593 (1996).
42. SL Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504-06, 113 S. Ct. 2742. 2746 (1993).
43. This suit was filed before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which allows jury
trials In employment discrimination suits. The 1991 Act allows jury trials if the plaintiff is seeking
compensatory or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(c) (1994).
44. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 970 F.2d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1992).
45. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508, 113 S. Ct. at 2748 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks. 970
F.2d 487. 492 (8th Cir. 1992)).
46. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514, 113 S. Ct. at 2751.
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to be a "pretext for discrimination." To prove "pretext for discrimination," the
employee must prove: (1) that the defendant's explanation for its employment
decision was pretextual; and (2) that discrimination was the true reason.47
2. Burden of Persuasion vs. Burden of Production
The holding in Hicks governs the situation in which a party questions
whether the employee has carried his burden of persuasion, but it does not
address the question of what constitutes sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to
meet his burden of production at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework (i.e. what the plaintiff must show at the third stage of the McDonnell
Douglas framework in order to survive a defendant's motion challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence). The difference between "burden of persuasion" and
"burden of production" is central to understanding the problem which was later
faced by the Fifth Circuit in Rhodes and understanding why Hicks did not
resolve the issue in Rhodes.
The burden of persuasion refers to the overall findings that must be made
by the trier of fact in order for the plaintiff to prevail in the suit.' To meet the
burden of persuasion, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against him. This issue was addressed in Hicks because in that
case, it was the plaintiff, not the defendant, moving for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. In order for a plaintiff to be entitled to summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law, he must not only meet the sufficiency of the
evidence requirements involved in his burden of production but must also satisfy
his overall burden of persuasion, which is proving intentional discrimination.49
For a court to award a plaintiff summary judgment or judgment as a matter of
law, the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination by such evidence that it
would be unreasonable for a trier of fact to conclude otherwise. Because
granting this motion takes the overall question in the case away from the trier of
fact, this is necessarily a substantial burden.". However, before this finding can
be made, the plaintiff and defendant must meet their respective burdens of
production within the context of the McDonnell Douglas framework.3 '
The "burden of production" relates to the requirement that the plaintiff
produce sufficient evidence which would justify a verdict in his favor.52
Sufficient evidence is a matter to be decided by the court and not the trier of
fact.53 "The court will not submit a case to the jury unless it decides as an
47. 1U at 515, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
48. Fleming James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure § 4.14, at 214 (4th ed. 1992).
49. Id. § 4.14, at 214-215.
50. 1d
51. See supra text accompanying notes 9-22 for discussion of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.
52. James, supra note 48. 8 7.14, at 339-40.
53. Id. § 7.19, at 357.
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initial matter that the proponent has proven each of the propositions essential to
the claim by sufficient evidence to justify or warrant a finding in the proponent's
favor .... "-,*4 Essentially, "burden of persuasion" refers to the quantity and
quality of evidence a plaintiff must provide to prevail in the suit, while "burden
of production" refers to how much evidence a plaintiff must have to present a
question of fact to the factfinder.5 ' Put differently, burden of persuasion deals
with the weight of the evidence, whereas burden of production deals with the
sufficiency of the evidence.
3. Hicks' Dictum Regarding Sufficiency of the Evidence
While the holding of the Court in Hicks addressed burden of persuasion and
weight of the evidence under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Court also
addressed, in dictum, the plaintiff's burden of producing sufficient evidence.56
The Court articulated the following method by which the plaintiff may satisfy the
requirement of proving "pretext for discrimination" through circumstantial
evidence:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity)
may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons, will: permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination .... s'
This statement, however, appears to contradict a later statement in which the
Court defines "pretext for discrimination" as requiring the employee to show
"both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason."58
These two statements, while seemingly contradictory, are resolved by the Court
when viewed in the proper context. In order to prove intentional discrimination
and thereby carry his ultimate burden of persuasion, the plaintiff must establish
his prima facie case, establish that the defendant's explanation was pretextual,
and establish that the true reason was intentional discrimination. Evidence of the
54. Id.
55. The burden of persuasion (i.e., proving intentional discrimination) will always be on the
plaintiff. This does not, however, mean that all burdens of persuasion will always be on theplaintiff..
For example, in the case of proving affirmative defenses, the burden of persuasion is on the
defendant.
56. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993). This
statement and the statement following it are dictum because they relate to a test for sufficiency of
the evidence which was not the issue before the Court. The question before the Court dealt solely
with what a plaintiff must prove to satisfy the burden of persuasion of intentional discrimination and
not whether that showing was supported by sufficient evidence.
57. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. This statement by the Court in Hicks will
hereafter be referred to as the "permissive inference" language.
58. td at 515, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
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plaintiff's prima facie case and of pretext may be sufficient to allow the trier of
fact to find intentional discrimination, but this finding must actually occur and
the jury is not required to make such a finding merely because there was
sufficient evidence.59
In Hicks, the trier of fact had specifically found that St. Mary's did not
intentionally discriminate against Hicks. Therefore, Hicks had failed to meet his
burden of persuasion. On appeal, the only'question before the Court was
whether the burden of persuasion could be carried by the plaintiff merely by
proving pretext. According to the Supreme Court, the answer to this question
is clearly no. In the words of the Court, "We have no authority to impose
liability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices
unless an appropriate factfinder determines, according to proper procedures, that
the employer has unlawfully discriminated."'
4. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, writing for four Justices in dissent in Hicks, defined the
plaintiffs burden of persuasion under the McDonnell Douglas framework
differently. He adopted the approach articulated by the Court earlier in Burdine
in that once the employer offers his nondiscriminatory reasons, the employee
may prove the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination either through direct
evidence or "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence." '"
The basis for Justice Souter's argument is that the purpose of requiring the
employer to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision is
to narrow the scope of the remaining issues that the plaintiff must address in
order to prove intentional discrimination. 2 Under his analysis, once the
employee has shown the employer's reasons to be untrue, the employee has
59. I1 at 511 n.4, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 n.4 (Justice Scalia attempts to resolve these statements
In a footnote where he states that "even though rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is
enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be afinding of discrimination.").
60. Id at 514, 113 S. Ct. at 2751. See also id. at 515, 113 S. Ct. at 2751 (explaining that
merely proving the employer's reasons for the employment action were "not believable" can not act
as a substitute for a finding of intentional discrimination).
61. Id at 541, 113 S. Ct. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095 (1981)). Justice Scalia in the second
part of his majority opinion admits this language is clearly expressed in Burdine but dismisses it as
dictum and an "inadvertence" on the part of the Court in that case. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517-18. 113
S. Ct. at 2752-53. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, cites with
approval the Court's earlier decision in United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 103 S. Ct. 1478 (1983), for its characterization of the pretext inquiry. Hicks, 509 U.S. at
518-19, 113 S. Ct. at 2753 ('[W]hatever doubt Burdine might have created was eliminated by
Aikens."). However, as Justice Souter points out, the Court in Aikens "quoted with approval the
passage that the majority's opinion dismissed as an 'inadvertence."' Odell. supra note 26, at 1267
(citing Hicks. 509 U.S. at 541-42. 113 S. Ct. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
62. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 530, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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proven intentional discrimination. This is clearly an example of pretext-only
analysis as applied to the burden of persuasion. Justice Souter stated that the
employee should not be punished by the employer's decision not to provide a
truthful explanation for the employment action regardless of the employer's
probable embarrassment, even if the decision would not constitute actionable
employment discrimination. 0 More importantly, Justice Souter predicted that
even though the case was about burden of persuasion, courts would inevitably
look to Hicks to provide an answer to the question of burden of production. He
believed that in doing so, courts would construe the majority's approach as
advocating a "pretext-plus" analysis of pretext evidence and necessarily result in
many summary judgments for employers."
Ill. RHODEs V. GUIBERSON OIL ToOs
In early 1996, the Fifth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, decided Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools.6 The case involved a salesman, Rhodes, who began
working for Dresser Industries in 1955. Because of the downturn in the oil industry
in the mid 1980s and to avoid being laid off, Rhodes transferred to Compac,
another division of Dresser, which later became Guiberson Oil Tools. Seven
months after his transfer, Rhodes, who was fifty-six years old at the time, was
discharged by Guiberson Oil Tools. As the reason for this decision, Guiberson
stated that Rhodes was discharged because of a reduction in work force, and that
it would consider hiring him back. Guiberson, however, later hired a forty-two year
old to do the same job as Rhodes within two months of Rhodes' discharge.66
Rhodes sued Guiberson Oil Tools under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act67 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana." A jury found that Rhodes was discharged because of his age, but that
Guiberson Oil Tools had not willfully violated the ADEA. 0 Guiberson appealed
the verdict on the ground that the district court erred in not granting its motion for
a directed verdict or its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
both challenged the sufficiency of the evidence."
A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the
district court's judgment on the ground that it was not supported by sufficient
63. Id. at 527-28, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J.. dissenting).
64. Id at 535-36, 113 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65. 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
66. Id. at 991-92.
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
68. The parties agreed to have the issue of liability heard before a jury and to have the
remaining Issues decided by a magistrate judge.
69. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 992. The remedy for age discrimination in employment is backpay.
If it is determined that the age discrimination is willful, there is a penalty of liquidated damages
which is backpay times two. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
70. Guiberson Oil Tools also appealed on the ground that the damages were excessive. Rhodes
v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1994).
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evidence. The Fifth Circuit panel held that a plaintiff's burden of production at
the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework consists not only of
sufficient evidence that the defendant's reason was untrue, but also of sufficient
evidence that discrimination was the true reason for the termination.7  The
court found that Rhodes had not produced sufficient evidence to support a
finding of intentional discrimination and reversed the district court's decision
denying Guiberson Oil Tools' motions for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.'
It was the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks that prompted the Fifth Circuit to reconsider en banc its panel decision in
Rhodes, even though Hicks was decided prior to that panel decision.73 On
rehearing, the issue before the court in Rhodes was what type of evidence
constitutes sufficient evidence so that the plaintiff, by meeting his burden of
production, can overcome a defendant's motion challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence and have the issue of intentional discrimination left for the trier of
fact."4 Although the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc to reconsider its
decision in Rhodes in light of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the court,
recognizing the different context in which the question of pretext was presented
in the two cases, found that Hicks provided no categorical answer to the question
of sufficiency of the evidence.
75
A. Judges Davis and Duhe's Majority Opinion
The majority in Rhodes did not find the holding in Hicks controlling because
that case dealt with the burden of persuasion, not production. The Fifth Circuit
did, however, rely on the "permissive inference" language which was dictum in
Hicks,7 and held that:
[A] jury issue will be presented and a plaintiff can avoid summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law if the evidence taken as a
whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's
71. Id
72. Id at 545.
73. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
74, The court noted that motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter
of law are both resolved under the same test announced in Boeing Co. v. Shipman. 411 F.2d 365 (5th
Cir. 1969) (en banc), because both Involve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Rhodes, 75 F.3d
at 993.
75. Hicks involved the plaintiffs burden of persuasion in order to sustain his own motion for
judgment as a matter of law so that the Issue of intentional discrimination would not be left to the
trier of fact to decide. The Issue was not whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
of intentional discrimination but whether a finding of pretext, by itself was enough to entitle the
plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. In contrast, Rhodes involved a finding of intentional
discrimination being challenged by a defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had not satisfied his
burden of production by producing sufficient evidence.
76. See supra text accompanying note 57 for "permissive inference" language.
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stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates
a reasonable inference that [discrimination] was a determinative factor
in the actions of which [the] plaintiff complains."
7
Although the court stated that, "ordinarily," verdicts based on the "permissive
inference" language will be supported by sufficient evidence, this will not always
be the case." To determine whether sufficient evidence is present in a
particular case, the factfinder's decision to infer intentional discrimination will
be subjected to the court's "traditional sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis. ' ' 9
Acknowledging that what constitutes sufficient evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation will vary from case to case, the court identified several hypothetical
situations to illustrate the application of the Rhodes standard. "A jury may be
able to infer discriminatory intent in an appropriate case from substantial
evidence that the employer's proffered reasons are false.' 'sc Alternatively, if the
plaintiff's evidence of a prima facie case and pretext is not "substantial," it
would not be reasonable for a jury to infer intentional discrimination.'
Because of the generality in which these examples are stated, they do not provide
practical guidelines for future suits in which the Rhodes standard is applied.
By subjecting the trier of fact's decision to infer intentional discrimination
from evidence of pretext to the general sufficiency of the evidence scrutiny, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the pretext-only and pretext-plus rules in favor of the
permissive inference approach. Under the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit,
a court must not only evaluate the employee's showing of pretext for sufficiency
of the evidence to determine if he has met his burden of production at the third
stage of the inquiry, but must also test the plaintiff's evidence as a whole to
determine whether he has proven intentional discrimination by evidence that is
sufficient to warrant an inference of intentional discrimination.
B. Judge Garza's Special Concurrence
Judge Garza, who specially concurred in the opinion, specifically challenged
the majority's determination that evidence which supports an inference of
intentional discrimination under Hicks is subject to the Fifth Circuit's traditional
77. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 994.
78. Id. at 993 ("It is unclear.. . whether the Court intended that in all such cases in which an
inference of discrimination is permitted a verdict of discrimination is necessarily supported by
sufficient evidence.").
79. Id at 993. The Fifth Circuit decision in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365. 374-75 (5th
Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Sourlock Marine, Inc., No. 95-
30250, 30272, 1997 WL 57755 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 1997), outlines this circuit's test for a sufficiency-
of-the-evidence challenge made In motions for summary judgment and/or motions for judgment as
a matter of law. The Boeing test requires there to be "a conflict in substantial evidence to create a
jury question."
80. Rhodes. 75 F.3d at 994.
81. Id. at 994.
19971 1407
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
sufficiency of the evidence standard.82 Unlike the majority in Rhodes, who
characterized the "permissive inference" language of Hicks as ambiguous, Judge
Garza found it to be "very clear."' 3 While "[t]he ultimate issue in [employment
discrimination] cases is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff,"" the trier of fact may infer intentional discrimination if the
employee provides sufficient evidence of a prima facie case and pretext.'
Consequently, evidence which is sufficient to allow the factfinder to draw an
inference of intentional discrimination (i.e., sufficient evidence of a prima facie
case and pretext) will always satisfy the sufficiency-of-the-evidence require-
ment."
Judge Garza clearly adopts the pretext-only standard for evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence but reaches a conclusion regarding the permissive
inference that is difficult to reconcile with traditionally accepted procedures for
appellate review of judgments for sufficiency of the evidence. Under the
approach advocated by Judge Garza, the sufficiency of the evidence inquiry, as
it relates to the plaintiff's case, will only be appropriate at the first stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework where the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case for intentional discrimination. Judge Garza characterizes the pretext stage
of the McDonnell Douglas framework as a credibility decision for the trier of
fact, and as a credibility determination, he states that it would be impermissible
to allow an appellate court to review the trier of fact's decision based on the
Fifth Circuit's test for sufficiency of the evidence.87 Under his analysis, the
trier of fact's finding that the defendant's explanation for the employment
decision was pretextual is not subject to review by an appellate court absent a
finding of manifest error." Therefore, should the plaintiff fail to produce
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, he will lose at the first stage,
and the inquiry will not proceed. When the plaintiff does establish a prima facie
case by sufficient evidence and the defendant meets his burden of production at
the second stage, the only remaining issue is for the trier of fact to determine
which party it believes, the plaintiff or the defendant.' 9 Under Judge Garza's
approach, once the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination becomes a
question for the trier of fact, the determination made by the trier of fact cannot
82. Id at 997 (Garza. J., specially concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749
(1993),
86. Id
87. Id at 998-99 (Garza, J., specially concurring) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman. 411 F.2d
365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (stating that it is not the court's responsibility to "weigh
conflicting evidence and inferences, [nor) determine the credibility of witnesses")).
88. Rhodes. 75 F.3d at 999 (Garza, J., specially concurring) ("To the degree that we use Boeing
as a vehicle to decide whether a jury's disbelief of the defendant is supported by sufficient evidence,
we violate the spirit of the Supreme Court precedent and the letter of our own.").
89. Id. at 998 (Garza, .. specially concurring).
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be reversed by an appellate court on the ground that the plaintiff did not produce
sufficient evidence of pretext. Based on this conclusion, a reviewing court may
never question the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the truth of the
defendant's explanation for the employment decision once the trier of fact has
decided this issue and chosen to infer intentional discrimination.9°
It is true that a decision regarding the credibility of witnesses is a duty left
for the trier of fact, but it is certainly within the province of the appellate court
to determine whether the evidence provided by that witness is sufficient to
support a finding that the defendant's explanation Was untrue. Essentially, the
trier of fact may' believe whomever he chooses, but the evidence presented on
the issue of pretext must still be sufficient to warrant a finding that the
defendant's reason was untrue. It is important to note-that the result adopted by
Judge Garza regarding appellate review is not the necessary result of adopting
the pretext-only approach, but rather arose out of his attempt to reconcile the
Fifth Circuit's traditional approach to sufficiency of the evidence with the
Supreme Court's proclamations in Hicks.
IV. APPLICATION OF RHODES
In the short time since the court's decision in Rhodes, the Fifth Circuit has
had several occasions to apply its standard for sufficiency of the evidence in
reviewing motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter
of law. While the majority of these cases represent a straightforward application
of the court's pronouncement that evidence of pretext is usually sufficient
evidence for a plaintiff to survive challenges, a few have achieved the opposite
result. The first such case is Ontiveros v. Asarco Inc.91
In Ontiveros, the Western District of Texas entered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff upon a jury verdict in a Title VII action based on discrimination because
of national origin. The defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law, and the
district court denied the motion. The Fifth Circuit, on appeal, considered the issue
of whether the plaintiff had met his burden of producing sufficient evidence to
support the inference of intentional discrimination made by the jury in the district
court proceeding. The court assumed for argument's sake that the plaintiff had
established sufficient evidence to prove pretext. It then proceeded to make a
statement that, even given sufficient evidence of pretext, there was insufficient
evidence to support the Inference of intentional discrimination.92 Unfortunately,
the court failed to detail why it reached this conclusion or what a plaintiff in this
situation would have to show in order to avoid a judgment as a matter of law. The
90. The result of Judge Gara's approach, when taken to its logical conclusion, is that an
appellate court can review the evidence of pretext for sufficiency when the challenge comes before
the issue is placed before the trier of fact, but that after the trier of fact finds pretext, this review for
sufficiency may no longer take place.
91. 83 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 1996).
92. Id. at 733.
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court merely stated that this was the "very rare situation" that Rhodes contemplated
when it refused to adopt the pretext-only standard for sufficiency of the evidence
challenges made by a defendant.93
Judge Oarza concurred in the result reached by the court. His concurrence was
premised on the idea that the majority correctly applied the Rhodes standard, but
that the Rhodes standard still represented a mistaken interpretation of Hicks. Judge
Garza, quoting his concurrence in Rhodes, stated: "I fail to understand how the
Court can logically conclude that a jury---that is 'permitted' to reach a specific
inference through the focused Title VII framework at work in Hicks--could at the
same time be acting outside the broad umbrella of 'reasonableness' established by
[the Fifth Circuit's sufficiency test]."'
A similar result was reached by the Fifth Circuit in Simms v. First Gibraltar
Bank.s Simms involved a white landlord who asserted violations of the Fair
Housing Act (FHA)" when the defendant bank refused to issue a commitment
letter to refinance an existing loan on his apartment complex.97 A jury found in
favor of Simms, the plaintiff, and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.s
First Gibraltar, the defendant, appealed the judgment on the ground that the
evidence presented was insufficient to support a jury verdict based on intentional
discrimination.1 Once again the Fifth Circuit was required to apply its decision
in Rhodes to determine if a plaintiff could defeat a defendant's sufficiency of the
evidence challenge to a jury finding of intentional discrimination.
The Fifth Circuit, applying the Rhodes standard, concluded that the plaintiff
had satisfied the pretext requirement by creating a fact issue as to each of First
Gibraltar's stated reasons for refusing to refinance the loan. The court, however,
said that "a reasonable jury could not infer from the evidence as a whole that
race was a significant factor in First Gibraltar's refusal to issue a commitment
letter."' As in Ontiveros, the court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, after
finding that pretext was established, on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
provide sufficient evidence that discrimination was the true motivation for the
decision. It is apparent in Simms that the plaintiff fully established pretext by
sufficient evidence.' In contrast, the court in Ontiveros merely assumed
93. Id at 734.
94. Id (Garza, J.. specially concurring) (quoting Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 998 n.2 (Garza, J., specially
concurring)).
95. 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996).
96. Id at 1556 ("The holding in Rhodes may be appropriately applied to this FHA case in
which the question is whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for the jury to make a
reasonable Inference that race motivated First Gibraltar's rejection of Simms' proposal.").
97. Id. at 1548.
98. The jury awarded Simms compensatory and punitive damages totalling over $3 million
dollars. Id. at 1554.
99. Id
100. Id at 1557-58.
101. Id at 1557 ("Simms' evidence satisfied Rhodes' first requirement by creating a fact issue as
to whether each of First Gibraltar's stated reasons for refusal actually motivated First Gibraltar .... ").
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pretext was established for the sake of argument."re Noticeably absent from
the opinion in Simms was the statement in Rhodes outlining the scenarios where
evidence of pretext may support a factfinder's inference of discrimination when
it is supported by substantial evidence.'03 The court in Simmhs clearly made
this finding, but failed to uphold the jury's finding of intentional discrimination.
Under the approach advocated by Judge Garza in Rhodes, a different result
would have been reached in both of these cases. Because he adopts the pretext-
only approach, the trier of fact's decision to infer intentional discrimination
would be upheld because the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of pretext.
Moreover, under Judge Garza's interpretation, the jury's determination would not
be subject to sufficiency review. Therefore, the judgments for the plaintiffs in
both cases would have been sustained.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Why the Fifth Circuit Should Have Adopted Pretext-Only
The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Rhodes carries with it significant
implications not only for the method in which the McDonnell Douglas
framework will be applied, but also for employment discrimination law as a
whole. By adopting the "permissive inference" approach to the evaluation of the
pretext issue, the court has made it more difficult for a plaintiff in this circuit to
get his case before a jury than would be the case under a pretext-only ap-
proach.104 A plaintiff faced with a defendant's motion for summary judgment
and/or judgment as a matter of law must not only provide sufficient evidence that
the employer's explanation for its employment decision was pretextual, but must
also provide sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer
that intentional discrimination was the true reason.
The most important consequence of the decision in Rhodes is that it severely
erodes a plaintiff's ability to prove intentional discrimination through circumstan-
tial evidence. A plaintiff seeking to prove that he has been subjected to
employment discrimination essentially has two methods through which he can
establish his claim. The first requires the presentation of direct evidence that he
was discriminated against by his employer. The second allows the plaintiff to
present circumstantial evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that
he was discriminated against by his employer. It is frequently stated in
employment discrimination opinions that very rarely will a plaintiff have a case
102. Ontiveros v. Asarco Inc., 83 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[Wle assume arguendo that
the evidence suffices to establish a fact question as to pretext.").
103. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
104. Also, even if the issue of intentional discrimination does become a question for the trier
of fact, the plaintiffs case can still be subjected to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge raised by
a motion for a judgment as a matter of law after the trier of fact's determination.
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in which there exists direct evidence of intentional discrimination.)s It was
for this reason that the Supreme Court developed the McDonnell Douglas
framework to deal with cases in which direct evidence is not available. The
Fifth Circuit's decision in Rhodes, however, seriously impedes the effectiveness
of this second method of proving intentional discrimination. The most significant
effect of adopting the permissive inference approach to pretext evidence is that
an employee contemplating bringing suit for intentional discrimination proceeds
with uncertainty as to whether the evidence he can produce will be sufficient to
support an inference of intentional discrimination. The two most obvious
examples of this lack of predictability are the Fifth Circuit's decisions in
Ontlveros and Simms where the court found sufficient evidence of pretext but
insufficient evidence to support the inference of intentional discrimination. These
cases illustrate that unlike the pretext-only or pretext-plus approaches, the
permissive inference approach is far from a bright-line rule as to what constitutes
evidence sufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination.
The major criticism of the pretext-only approach is that it will allow the trier
of fact to find intentional discrimination based solely on its disbelief of the
explanation provided by the employer. This criticism arises out of confusion as
to the difference between a burden of persuasion and a burden of production, and
is unfounded because of the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks. The Court in
Hicks specifically held that an employee can not meet his burden of persuasion
without proving intentional discrimination. Any approach a court may adopt,
whether pretext-only, pretext-plus, or permissive inference, to evaluate the
sufficiency of pretext evidence and, consequently, the plaintiff's burden of
production at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework does in no
way act as a substitute for a plaintiffs duty to meet his overall burden of
persuasion. Adopting a less burdensome approach such as pretext-only merely
increases the likelihood that the issue of intentional discrimination will be
decided by the trier of fact after all of the evidence is presented, rather than by
a judge as a question of law.
B. Adoption of Permissive Inference in Rhodes Does Not Mean McDonnell
Douglas Should Be Abandoned
This analysis begs the question that, if the permissive inference approach
increases both the evidentiary burden of production and uncertainty of a plaintiff,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the McDonnell Douglas framework as a
viable avenue for proving employment discrimination through circumstantial
evidence, why use the framework? The simple answer is that if courts continue
to apply a heightened approach to pretext evidence, the framework should be
discarded.1'6 However, this would not solve the problem. Because the
105. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228, 271, 109 S. Ci. 1775, 1802 (1989).
106. Malamud, supra note 25, at 2236.
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majority of employment discrimination suits involve only circumstantial
evidence, a reasoned approach, containing necessary safeguards against frivolous
complaints, such as the one offered by the Court in McDonnell Douglas and
clarified in Burdine and Hicks, is an essential avenue of relief for plaintiffs who
have been subjected to intentional discrimination.
In a theoretical sense, one could argue that because the permissive inference
approach requires the trier of fact's decision to infer intentional discrimination
to be supported by sufficient evidence, proving "pretext" by itself no longer
means anything, and the McDonnell Douglas framework is, therefore, ineffective.
This argument, however, is untrue. In Rhodes, the Fifth Circuit explicitly
recognized that "ordinarily," a decision of the trier of fact to infer intentional
discrimination, when that decision is based solely on the plaintiff's establishment
of a prima facie case and pretext, will be supported by sufficient evidence."0
The court here recognizes that in most cases what is essentially "pretext-only"
evidence will be sufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination.
Therefore, the effectiveness of the McDonnell Douglas framework may be
preserved, if not in legal. theory, in practice within this circuit. Certainly,
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases prefer the pretext-only approach,
but the Rhodes standard is unquestionably better than pretext-plus. Rhodes
retains the target of pretext in employment discrimination cases with the
assurance that plaintiffs who hit that target will "ordinarily" survive motions for
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit in Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools stated that sufficient
evidence of a prima facie case and of pretext would normally be sufficient to
allow the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination. If this statement plays
out in practice within the Fifth Circuit, the McDonnell Douglas framework will
continue to be a viable tool for proving employment discrimination through
circumstantial evidence. While it is still probably too early to tell, results like
those reached in Ontiveros and Simms raise questions as to the validity of the
court's statement. Both Ontiveros and Simms exemplify the result which Justice
Souter in Hicks and Judge Garza in Rhodes predicted would occur. In both
cases, jury verdicts for the plaintiff were overturned because the appellate court
did not find sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination notwithstanding
sufficient evidence of pretext; a result the court said "ordinarily" would not
occur.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks answers the question of what a plaintiff
must prove in order to prevail in an employment discrimination suit. The
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, that the
defendant's reason for the employment decision was untrue, and that the true
107. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993.
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reason for the employment decision was intentional discrimination. The Fifth
Circuit in Rhodes, recognizing that Hicks did not answer the question before it,
applied dictum from Hicks to answer the question of what a plaintiff must
produce at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework in order to
survive a defendant's motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. While
it is clear from Hicks that a finding of intentional discrimination must be made
by the trier of fact in order for the plaintiff to prevail, reading Hicks as requiring
the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to meet
his burden of production seriously undermines the "indirect" route of proving
employment discrimination through circumstantial evidence. More importantly,
the decision in Rhodes fails to provide an employee any guarantee that on the
pretext evidence he presented, the question of intentional discrimination will at
the very least become a question to be answered by the trier of fact.
T. Christopher Pledger*
* Recipient of the Vinson & Elkins Best Student Article Award, 1996.97.
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